The Ineffectiveness of Criminal Prosecution in Tax Recovery in Ghana: Insights from the Case of The Republic v. Warren Oil Company Limited

Abstract

The complexities of prosecuting tax defaulters and its ineffectiveness as a tax recovery measure were highlighted in the recent case of The Republic V Warren Oil Company Ltd (Case No. CRT/12/2022, unreported). The company and its directors were convicted and sentenced to pay a fine of 800 penalty units, or in default, a one-year jail term for failing to pay tax amounting to Gh¢4,512,150.51.  Despite facing a potential sentence of a fine and/or jail time, the company and its directors defaulted in their obligations under the settlement process and this led to the conviction and sentencing of the company and its directors. In this paper, the author examines the sentencing of the accused persons in light of section 80 of the Revenue Administration Act and argues that the punitive measures for tax defaulters in the Revenue Administration Act are inadequate. The author also examines the alternative mechanisms employed in other jurisdictions such as offer in compromise programs, longer installment agreements, and makes recommendations aimed at making Ghana’s tax recovery and compliance system more equitable and effective.

Introduction

On March 14, 2024, Warren Oil Company Limited and its directors were convicted and sentenced to pay a fine of 800 penalty units or, in default, a one-year jail term for failing to pay tax to the tune of Gh¢ 4,512,150.51 contrary to section 80 of the Revenue Administration Act, 2016 (Act 915). In line with the current penalty unit value, the company and its directors will pay Gh¢ 9600 as punishment for refusing to pay Gh¢ 4,512,150.51 as taxes they collected from consumers of petroleum products on behalf of the government.

The facts of this case are that the accused persons lifted petroleum products in April 2019 but failed to pay Special Petroleum Tax, Energy Debt Recovery Levy, Road Fund Levy, and Energy Fund Levy owed the State. 

The taxes and levies are built into petroleum products and are paid by consumers when they buy petroleum products at the pumps. Oil marketing companies (OMCs) such as Warren Oil are expected to collect the tax component on petroleum products and pay same to the government.

Legal Framework for Tax Recovery

Under the Revenue Administration Act, the Commissioner-General may initiate proceedings against defaulted taxpayers in court to recover unpaid taxes as well as the cost of the suit.[1]  The Act also grants the Commissioner-General administrative enforcement powers to recover the tax due the Republic without resort to the Court. These administrative enforcement powers of the Commissioner-General include the following:

1. Creation of Charge Over Assets: The Commissioner-General has the power to create a charge in favour of the Government of Ghana over the assets of a defaulting taxpayer, and can take possession, and sell the charged assets through public auction to settle the unpaid taxes and interests.[2] The remainder of the sale proceeds is paid to the taxpayer after the sale proceeds have been utilized for cost of charge and sale of the asset, for the outstanding tax and the interest accrued thereon, and any other unpaid tax. [3] However, where the sale proceeds are not sufficient to pay the full amount secured by the charge, the Commissioner-General has the power to recover the remainder from the taxpayer or from third parties holding funds on behalf of the taxpayer.[4]
2. Restraint of Defaulting Taxpayer from Leaving the Country: The Commissioner-General also has the power to request the Comptroller-General of Immigration, by a notice in writing, to prevent a defaulting taxpayer from leaving the country if the Commissioner-General has reason to believe that the defaulting taxpayer may leave the country. [5] The Comptroller-General of Immigration shall prevent the defaulting taxpayer from leaving the country for a period of seven (7) days from the time a notice is received from the Commissioner-General to that effect. The Commissioner-General shall apply to the High Court for an extension of the seven days period.[6]
3. Restraining Orders: The Commissioner-General may use reasonable force to distrain the goods of a defaulting taxpayer, or distrain and search the premises, place, conveyance or other asset of a defaulting taxpayer if the Commissioner-General believes or has reasonable grounds to believe that the tax due by the taxpayer has not been paid or will not be paid.[7]
4. Recovery from Third Parties: The Revenue Administration Act grants the Commissioner-General the power to recover unpaid taxes from managers of an entity that has failed to pay its taxes[8]; from a receiver of an asset of a defaulting taxpayer which is situated in Ghana[9]; and from a third-party debtor (usually banks) who holds funds on behalf of the taxpayer.[10]

In the Warren case, the Authority invoked all these powers given to the Commissioner-General under the law to retrieve the tax liability from the company but these measures proved unsuccessful. For instance, although third-party debtor notices were issued and served on financial institutions that were presumed to hold money on behalf of the taxpayer, these financial institutions were unable to comply with the notices due to lack of funds in the accounts of the taxpayer. Again, the bonds or guarantees issued by an insurance company that were provided as security for the lifting of the petroleum products by Warren Oil company could not be fully redeemed since the insurance company later alleged that the taxpayer had acquired the bond/guarantee fraudulently and were therefore not obliged to satisfy the tax liability of the company.

Legal Proceedings and Settlement

The company submitted a proposal to the Authority to reschedule payment of their outstanding liability for 12 months, but it failed to make the monthly installment payments. As a last resort to recover the taxes, the file of Warren Oil Company was escalated to the Legal Department of the Authority for prosecution.

The company and its directors were charged with the offence of failing to pay tax under Section 80 of Act 915. The law states as follows:

“Offence of failing to pay tax 

80. A person who fails to pay tax by the date on which the tax is payable commits an offence and is liable on summary conviction 

(a)  where the failure relates to an amount exceeding two thousand currency points, to a fine of not less than two hundred penalty units and not more than one thousand penalty units or to a term of imprisonment of not less than three months and not more than one year or to both; and 

(b)  in any other case, to a fine of not less than fifty penalty units and not more than two hundred penalty units or to a term of imprisonment of not less than one month and not more than three months or to both.”  (emphasis mine)

The prosecution of the case began in 2021. Initially, the accused persons pleaded not guilty to the charges. They then submitted another payment plan to the Authority to satisfy their outstanding tax liability in 12 months. The Authority obliged them the second time. However, since the matter was already in court and the company and its directors were being prosecuted, the terms of settlement between the Authority and the accused persons to reschedule the payment of the outstanding tax liability was made pursuant to Section 35 of the Courts Act, 1993 (Act 459). The law provides as follows: 

“Section 35—Offer of Compensation or Restitution. 

1. Where a person is charged with an offence before the High Court or a Regional Tribunal, the commission of which has caused economic loss, harm or damage to the State or any State agency, the accused may inform the prosecutor whether the accused admits the offence and is willing to offer compensation or make restitution and reparation for the loss, harm or damage caused. 
2. Where an accused makes an offer of compensation or restitution and reparation, the prosecutor shall consider if the offer is acceptable to the prosecution. 
3. If the offer is not acceptable to the prosecution the case before the Court shall proceed. 
4. If the offer is acceptable to the prosecution, the prosecutor shall in the presence of the accused, inform the Court which shall consider if the offer of compensation or restitution and reparation is satisfactory. 
5. Where the Court considers the offer to be satisfactory, the Court shall accept a plea of guilty from the accused and convict the accused on his own plea, and in lieu of passing sentence on the accused, make an order for the accused to pay compensation or make restitution and reparation. 
6. An order of the Court under subsection (5) shall be subject to such conditions as the Court may direct.
7. Where a person convicted under this section defaults in the payment of any money required of the person under this section or fails to fulfil any condition imposed by the Court under subsection (6), any amount outstanding shall become due and payable and upon failure to make the payment, the Court shall proceed to pass a custodial sentence on the accused.”

Thus, as part of the terms of the agreement, the accused persons agreed to “change their plea of not guilty to guilty to the charge preferred against them”[11], and also agreed that “a default in the payment schedule or a failure to fulfil a condition imposed by the Court shall make the outstanding amount due and payable in full upon conviction, in addition to any other sentence by the Honorable Court”[12]. The terms of settlement, after it was signed by the Authority and the accused persons, was reduced into an agreement for the accused persons to settle their debt.

Around the time the agreement was adopted by the court, the National Petroleum Authority (NPA), on October 13, 2022, revoked the license of the company to trade as an Oil Marketing Company for “failure to comply with the NPA directives on the acquisition and maintenance of their license to operate as an OMC”,[13] consequently forcing the company out of business. It was therefore not surprising that the company defaulted, again, on the settlement plan. 

The prosecution then filed a motion for an order for conviction and sentencing of the accused persons pursuant to section 35(7) of Act 459, sections 80 and 84[14] of Act 915 as well as section 239 of the Criminal and Other Offences (Procedure) Act, 1960 (Act 30)[15], to convict the accused persons on their own plea and sentence them for the offence committed.[16]

In the accused persons’ affidavit in opposition to the prosecution’s motion, they contended that the company had “volunteered its assets to be liquidated on the open market and the proceeds applied directly to its liability”[17]. They also argued that they had petitioned the Commissioner-General to appoint a receiver to receive the proceeds, and that discussions with the Authority were far advanced and the asset, as at the time of filing the Affidavit in opposition, was being vetted by the Authority.[18]

 As part of their exhibits, they attached a petition they had written to the Authority requesting for the appointment of a receiver to receive proceeds of sale for the liquidation of tax liability[19] and a corresponding response from the Authority inviting the accused persons for a discussion on their “proposal, reconciliation of the outstanding debt and liquidation of the confirmed debt”.[20]

After hearing both counsel on the motion, the court on July 27, 2023, suspended the conviction and sentencing for two months, pending the outcome of the discussions between the Authority and the accused persons. 

On the date the accused persons were convicted and sentenced—that is, on March 14, 2024—the deliberations between the accused persons and the Authority on the liquidation of the former’s assets had not been concluded, and the company had also not made a significant payment of their tax liability to the Authority. In fact, they had only made payment of about GHS 150,000, which is just about 3% of the total tax liability owed.

 The court, before pronouncing judgment, intimated that the deliberations between the accused persons and the Authority were an administrative issue and that what the court was concerned about was what it had jurisdiction over. That is, whether the accused persons were guilty of the offence of failing to pay taxes. They had already pleaded guilty in the settlement terms and were therefore convicted and sentenced to a fine.

Flowing from the trajectory of this case, this paper seeks to draw out the complexities of prosecuting tax defaulters for the offence of failing to pay taxes, the ineffectiveness of the punishment prescribed in the offence under Section 80 of Act 915, and recommendations on alternative remedies in recovering taxes from tax defaulters.

Limitations of the Punitive Measures for the Offence of Failure to Pay Taxes Under Act 915

Applying the provisions of section 80 of Act 915 to the case of the Republic V Warren Oil and Ors., the accused persons were liable to a term of imprisonment for at least three (3) months and a maximum of one (1) year, or to a fine of at least Gh¢2,400 (200 penalty units) or a maximum of Gh¢12,000 (1000 penalty units)[21], or to both a term of imprisonment and a fine. Obviously, it is not practical for a tax defaulter who owes the State millions of Ghana Cedis to just pay a fine that is less than one percent (1%) of the actual liability owed. It sounds ridiculous that a tax defaulter who owes the State an amount of Gh¢4,512,150.51 is made to pay a paltry sum of Gh¢9,600 as a fine for the offence of failing to pay that huge amount of tax. 

Supposed the court had added a term of imprisonment to the fine or just imprisonment simpliciter which in fact, the court should have done because of the clause in Section 35 (7) of the Courts Act that says that “Where a person convicted under this section defaults in the payment of any money required of the person under this section or fails to fulfil any condition imposed by the Court under subsection (6), any amount outstanding shall become due and payable and upon failure to make the payment, the Court shall proceed to pass a custodial sentence on the accused.” (emphasis mine)

It is the opinion of the author that the punishment of imprisonment of at least three months and at most one year, despite it being more deterrent than the paltry fine, still wouldn’t have been enough remedy for the offence committed by the accused persons as it does not serve as a substantial deterrent for the offence of failing a huge tax liability of Gh¢4,512,150.51.

The primary rationale for prosecuting tax defaulters is to punish them for failing to fulfill their legal obligations. By imposing fines or custodial sentences, the legal system aims to penalize the taxpayer for non-compliance. This punishment is intended to reflect the seriousness of the offence and the breach of public trust, and should not be viewed as a mode for the recovery of outstanding taxes. Thus, prosecution of a taxpayer for the offence of failing to pay taxes should serve as a deterrent to both the convicted taxpayer and the general public. The threat of legal consequences, including imprisonment and fines, is intended to discourage taxpayers from evading their tax obligations. 

While the current punitive measures under Act 915 aim to address the offence of failing to pay taxes, there are significant limitations that undermine their effectiveness. These limitations are particularly evident in cases where the financial penalties and even the custodial sentences are disproportionately low compared to the amount of tax owed. As highlighted in the case of the Republic v Warren Oil and Ors., a fine of Gh¢9,600 for a tax liability of Gh¢4,512,150.51 is grossly inadequate and fails to serve as a grave deterrent to others who have plans to fail to pay taxes.

Recommendations for Reform

It is trite that taxes are the bedrock for a nation’s development. As said by Arthur Vanderbilt, “taxes are the lifeblood of government and no taxpayer should be permitted to escape the payment of his just share of the burden of contributing thereto.”[22] A nation that does not make enough revenue will have a crumbling economy and is bound to falter in providing services and public infrastructure to the people.  It therefore follows that a nation that only concerns itself with punishing tax defaulters for failing to pay tax by imprisonment and/ or a fine and not focus on recovering the tax will only shortchange itself. A prisoner needs to be taken care of in the prison with taxes. It is, therefore, not rational that a person who has failed to pay tax is jailed and catered for with the limited taxes of the state, when there are other avenues of retrieving the defaulted taxes from the taxpayer.

It has been argued by some tax professionals that even after prosecution, the state can still sue the defaulted taxpayer under civil litigation to recover the tax liability. It is the opinion of the writer that civil litigation after prosecution will be “much ado about nothing.” This is because the reliefs sought in such civil litigation are basically the powers that the Commissioner-General wield in recovering taxes. If the court gives judgment in favour of the State to recover its taxes from the tax defaulter, one of the ways to recover the taxes will be to garnishee the accounts of the tax defaulter. The State would have unsuccessfully pursed this path even before the start of the prosecution. 

Another way to recover the taxes will be to create a charge over the assets of the defaulter, take possession and sell the assets to recover the taxes. Again, it is plausible the State would have tried to recover the tax though this means before the prosecution began. This paints a picture of the State running in endless and fruitless circles with a taxpayer who has defaulted in paying taxes owed, especially where the latter becomes a “man of straw” and cannot repay his debts, no matter how hard the State tries.

Other jurisdictions have designed alternative legal avenues to retrieve some amounts of the tax liability from the defaulting taxpayer.

In the United States, for instance, the Internal Revenue Service has a programme called “Offer in Compromise” (OIC), which provides a mechanism for taxpayers unable to fully settle their tax liabilities to reach an agreement with the IRS to settle for a lesser amount.[23]

This programme, conditioned upon current and future tax compliance, offers defaulting taxpayers a chance for debt forgiveness and a fresh start.

There are prerequisites to qualify for this program, as a taxpayer who can pay their tax liability in full through installment agreement or by other means generally do not qualify for the OIC. 

Per information available from the IRS, a taxpayer who qualifies for this program must have:

1. “filed all tax returns;
2. received a tax bill for at least one tax debt included on the offer (OIC);
3. made all required estimated tax payments for the current year, and
4. made all required federal tax deposits for the current quarter and the two preceding quarters if the taxpayer is a business owner with employees.”[24]

The amount offered by the taxpayer in the OIC to the IRS must be commensurate with the reasonable collection potential (RCP). This RCP is “the value that can be realized from the taxpayer’s assets such as real property, automobiles, bank accounts, and other property”[25], as well as any “anticipated future income less certain amounts allowed for basic living expenses.”[26]

The rationale for the OIC seems to be based on the equitable principle of an effective tax administration. Per information available from the IRS, an offer by a taxpayer “may be accepted when there is no doubt that the tax is legally owed and that the full amount owed can be collected, but requiring payment in full would either create an economic hardship or would be unfair and inequitable because of exceptional circumstances.”[27] 

The offer is also accepted when the IRS is convinced that it cannot collect the full tax liability of the taxpayer considering their assets and income. This is known as “doubt as to collectability”.[28] Again, where there is a real dispute as to the right tax owed by the taxpayer under the law, the IRS may accept this offer. This is known as “doubt as to liability.”[29] 

The advantage of this program in a tax system is that it ensures effective voluntary tax compliance as the terms and conditions for the acceptance of an OIC include a requirement of the taxpayer to “timely file all their tax returns and timely pay all taxes for 5 years from the date of the acceptance of the OIC.”[30]

Another alternative is the Instalment Agreement between the Revenue Agency and the taxpayer. Admittedly, we have this in our Ghanaian tax laws as the Commissioner-General has the power to grant a taxpayer an extension of time to pay tax under a tax law upon application in writing.[31] The extension of time to pay tax granted to a taxpayer in Ghana cannot exceed 12 months in aggregate.[32] However, this 12-month moratorium for taxpayers to redeem their tax liability in instalment, in the author’s opinion, is quite short and most taxpayers end up defaulting. 

In the Ghanaian tax system, the law gives discretion to the Commissioner-General to remit an assessed tax, but only on cases where it is impossible to collect the tax.[33] The Commissioner-General has a wide discretion of refraining from assessing a penalty in whole or in part; extend the time for payment for a penalty, where a taxpayer who is liable to pay a penalty shows good cause to the Commissioner-General in writing. The Commissioner-General also has the power to remit or waive in part or in whole an assessed penalty.[34] A closer reading of this provision may mean that the Commissioner-General has the power to only extend penalties beyond the 12 months period stipulated by the Revenue Administration Act, and not the entire tax liability. 

Under the US tax system, a taxpayer can request a long-term payment plan (installation agreement) of their tax liability at a fee which is charged to cover the cost of providing the payment plan by the IRS.[35] A taxpayer has the option to request for a short term payment plan, where they are required to redeem their tax liability in 180 days or less; or request for a long term payment plan where they have up to 72 months (6 years) to redeem their tax liability.[36] With this longer period within which to redeem their tax liability,  taxpayers have a reasonable time to work or take steps to procure funds to redeem their tax liability. This becomes a win-win for the government and the taxpayers because the taxpayer is able to fend for himself or herself and also pays taxes to the government for the development of the nation.

These revenue collection mechanisms adopted by the US, in no doubt, provide opportunities for defaulting taxpayers who face financial hardship at some point to fulfil their tax obligations whilst facilitating revenue recovery for the State. 

The OECD recommends that a tax authority can launch an insolvency procedure where it has determined that a defaulted taxpayer is insolvent, in order to recover its tax debts.[37]

Enhancing Tax Recovery Efforts

There is a school of thought that if these options are given to defaulting taxpayers to redeem their tax liability, it will not motivate compliant taxpayers to keep filing and paying their taxes on time.[38] This writer suggests that if Ghana should adopt similar tax recovery programs, it should go with sanctions to deter others from being non-compliant. A harsh/stringent punishment for a defaulting taxpayer under a similar programme for instance, can be to place a lien on the defaulting taxpayers’ habitual abode until they pay off their liabilities under any of the programs the State implements. A good step the GRA has taken is the collection of property rate taxes in Ghana. With this, the Authority is privy to the database of property owners and it will therefore be easier to place a lien on the property of a defaulter. 

The State can also garnishee the retirement fund of the tax defaulter like it is practiced by the UK HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) where a taxpayer defaults in their tax liability and does not apply to the HRMC or cannot agree on an instalment plan.[39] A defaulting taxpayer’s contributions towards the SSNIT pension fund, for instance, can be used to offset their tax liability. This could be enough deterrence to make taxpayers compliant as no one would want their retirement savings to be touched. 

The tax authorities in Spain have implemented an IT tool called the Neutral Point that is used to identify any kind of payment from another public administration that is due to a defaulting taxpayer. If the amount to be paid is identified, the tax authorities can seize that amount to offset the defaulting taxpayer’s outstanding tax liability.[40] Ghana can implement a similar central point system with the other public sectors so that it can easily identify any payments due to a defaulting taxpayer and same seized to be used to offset their current tax liability.

Tracing assets of tax defaulters in Ghana can be quite cumbersome. The Commissioner-General writes to banks of the defaulting taxpayers to place a charge over their assets. There have been unconfirmed reports that some bankers even draw the attention of the account holders to withdraw their funds when they receive such letters from the Commissioner-General. The banks then write to the Commissioner-General informing her that there are no funds in the account of the defaulting taxpayer or that the taxpayer does not have an account with the banks.

This practice can be mitigated if the State can adopt a system where it automatically receives information about a tax debtor’s assets. The Exchange of Information Unit of the Ghana Revenue Authority is now able to exchange bank account information of taxpayers with other tax jurisdictions around the globe. Whilst this step is laudable, it is recommended that the information on assets of taxpayers, including immovable and movable properties can be exchanged through a central system where all government institutions such as SSNIT, the Attorney-General’s department, etc. can have access to recover debts from a State debtor.

In Slovenia, there is an Automatic Electronic Data Exchange system adopted by the country’s Financial Administration that exchanges information with banks and other property management companies. The system automatically updates every night with information about the properties of defaulting taxpayers. Their recovery officers then decide on the type of enforcement measure to use to collect the tax debt, depending on the state of the asset and its existence.[41] Armed with such information on the assets of defaulting taxpayers, a targeted and efficient enforcement measure can make the recovery of tax debts seemingly smooth and less cumbersome.

Most importantly, section 80 of Act 915 should be reviewed. The penalty prescribed for the offence of failing to pay tax should be expanded to accommodate the failure to pay huge amounts of taxes. Stated differently, the writer suggests that the punishment prescribed under section 80 of Act 915 should be commensurate with the tax liability owed. The penalty units should be increased and not capped to be commensurate with the tax liability owed. For example, the Value Added Tax Act, 2013 (Act 870) as amended under section 15 prescribes a penalty for failure to register which can be adopted under section 80 of Act 915. Section 15 of Act 870 provides that “a person who fails to apply for registration is liable to a penalty of not more than two times the amount of tax on taxable supply payable from the time the person is required to apply for registration until the person files an application for registration with the Commissioner-General.” (emphasis mine). Thus, a person who is charged with the offence of failing to pay tax under section 80 of Act 915 can be sentenced to a fine of two times the amount of tax owed and/or to a term of imprisonment. 

Conclusion

The Republic V Warren Oil Company Limited case exposes significant challenges in prosecuting tax defaulters and recovering outstanding tax liabilities in Ghana.  To effectively and efficiently prosecute tax defaulters for the offence of failing to pay tax under section 80 of Act 915, it is recommended that the law be amended to make the punishment deterrent enough to prevent taxpayers from defaulting. Again, policymakers can consider adopting other effective and equitable alternative measures implemented in other jurisdictions in the redemption of tax liabilities. Furthermore, expanding the availability of installment agreements and extending the repayment period for outstanding tax liabilities could provide defaulting taxpayers with more manageable pathways to fulfill their obligations. Through the adoption of these measures, Ghana can foster an efficient tax compliance system while mitigating non-effective punitive measures on taxpayers. 

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[1] Section 51(2) of the Revenue Administration Act, 2016 (Act 915)

[2] Sections 52-54 of Act 915

[3] Section 54(5) of Act 915

[4] Section 54(8) of Act 915

[5] Section 56(1) of Act 915

[6] Section 56(4) of Act 915

[7] Section 57(1)(2) of Act 915

[8] Section 58 (1) of Act 915

[9] Section 59 of Act 915

[10] Section 60 of Act 915

[11] Agreement between the Republic and the Accused persons pursuant to Section 35(7) of the Court Act, 1993 (Act 459) filed on 14-02-2023, para. 7

[12] Ibid, para. 12

[13] https://citinewsroom.com/2023/01/npa-revokes-licenses-of-30-omcs/

[14] Section 84 of Act 915 states as follows:

 “Section 84- Offences by entities

1. Subject to subsection (2), where an entity commits an offence under a tax law, a person who is a manager of the entity at that time is treated as also having committed the same offence.
2. Subsection (1) does not apply to a manager who has exercised the degree of care, diligence, and skill that a reasonably prudent person in the position of the manager would have exercised in preventing the commission of the offence.
3. Where a person who is a manager of an entity commits an offence under a tax law while acting in the capacity as a manager, the entity is treated as also committing the same offence.”

[15] Section 239 of Act 30 provides as follows: 

“Section 239. Plea of “guilty”

(1) A plea of guilty, when recorded, constitutes a conviction.

(2) Where an accused is arraigned on an indictment for an offence and can lawfully be convicted on

the indictment of any other offence not charged in the indictment, the accused may plead “not guilty” of

the offence charged in the indictment but “guilty” of the other offence.

(3) On the plea of guilty the Court may, with the consent of the prosecution, acquit the accused of the

offence with which the accused is charged and record the plea of guilty to the other offence.”

[16] This motion was filed on 04-07-2023.

[17] Paragraph 11 of Accused persons’ affidavit in opposition filed on 13-07-2023

[18] Ibid, paras. 12 & 13

[19] This petition was received by the Authority on 8th May 2023.

[20] This is an excerpt of the response from the Authority to Accused persons’ petition for liquidation dated 17th May 2023.

[21] A penalty unit currently is GHS 12.

[22] Appeal of N.Y. State Realty & Terminal Co., 21 N.J. 90, 98, 121 A.2d 21 (1956) https://www.casemine.com/judgement/us/5914ca0cadd7b049347f75f2#p96 

[23]https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc204#:~:text=An%20offer%20in%20compromise%20(OIC,an%20OIC%20in%20most%20cases.

[24] Ibid. 

[25] Ibid. 

[26] Ibid. 

[27] Ibid. 

[28] Ibid.

[29] Ibid. 

[30] Ibid. 

[31] Section 47(1) of the Revenue Administration Act, 2016 (Act 915)

[32] Section 47(3) of Act 915

[33] Section 65(1) of the Revenue Administration Act, 2016 (Act 915)

[34] Section 65(2) of Act 915

[35] https://www.irs.gov/payments/payment-plans-installment-agreements#plandef

[36] IRS: Topic No. 202, Tax Payment Options. https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc202

[37] OECD (2019), Successful Tax Debt Management: Measuring Maturity and Supporting Change, OECD, Paris. www.oecd.org/forum-on-tax-administration/publications-and-products/successful-tax-debt-mamagement-measuring-maturing-and-supporting-change.htm 

[38] Frey, B. S., & Torgler, B. (2007). "Tax Morale and Conditional Cooperation." Journal of Comparative Economics, 35(1), 136-159.

[39] If you cannot pay your tax bill on time, https://www.gov.uk/difficulties-paying-hmrc/if-you-do-not-pay, accessed on 03-18-2024

[40] OECD (2019), Successful Tax Debt Management: Measuring Maturity and Supporting Change, OECD, Paris. www.oecd.org/forum-on-tax-administration/publications-and-products/successful-tax-debt-mamagement-measuring-maturing-and-supporting-change.htm 

[41] OECD (2019), Successful Tax Debt Management: Measuring Maturity and Supporting Change, OECD, Paris. www.oecd.org/forum-on-tax-administration/publications-and-products/successful-tax-debt-mamagement-measuring-maturing-and-supporting-change.htm