High Court's full legal reasoning for rejecting Wontumi's adjournment, referral motions

The High Court in Accra rejected an attempt by lawyers for Bernard Antwi Boasiako, popularly known as Wontumi, to delay proceedings, ruling that court dates agreed to by counsel cannot later be displaced by a lawyer’s personal engagements.

Justice Audrey Kocuvie-Tay delivered the ruling on July 20, 2026, in the criminal case involving Wontumi, Kwame Antwi, who is said to be at large, and Akonta Mining Company Limited.

The adjournment request was contained in a letter dated July 17, 2026, and signed by Charles Boakye of Zoe, Akyea & Co. The defence asked the court to move the hearing of its application for deferment of judgment and constitutional referral from July 20 to July 22 because the substantive lawyer handling the matter was outside the jurisdiction on a prior personal engagement.

The court rejected that explanation, noting that the July 20 date had been fixed on June 29 in the presence of counsel after the defence was granted permission to file a closing address for the first and third accused persons.

Justice Kocuvie-Tay held that counsel should have disclosed any conflicting engagement when the date was being agreed. She said the court could then have consulted the parties and selected another date that was convenient to both the court and counsel.

According to the judge, lawyers owe a duty of candour to the court, particularly where a hearing date has been fixed with their input and express consent. She described the reliance on a “prior personal engagement” at that stage as untenable and added that the proposed July 22 date was not convenient to the court.

In reaching her decision, Justice Kocuvie-Tay relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Republic v High Court (Fast Track Division), Accra; Ex parte Sian Goldfields Limited, where the court stated that adjournments are subject to the convenience of the court and remain within the discretion of the trial judge.

She also cited Ali Yusif Issa (No. 2) v The Republic, in which the Supreme Court held that the refusal of an adjournment does not, by itself, amount to a denial of the constitutional right to a fair trial.

The judge concluded that adjournments are governed by the court’s convenience rather than the personal commitments of counsel. She further held that, where circumstances were genuinely beyond counsel’s control, alternative arrangements should have been made. The application for adjournment was therefore refused.

On the separate application seeking a deferment of judgment and a constitutional referral, the court considered whether it could determine the motion despite the absence of counsel to formally move it.

Justice Kocuvie-Tay relied on Republic v Court of Appeal; Ex parte Eastern Alloys Co. Ltd, which recognised that a judge has control over proceedings and may, depending on the circumstances, determine a motion on its merits even where the applicant or counsel is absent.

The court held that there is no rule requiring every application to be formally moved orally before it can be determined. Once a motion has been filed, has reached its return date and the case has been called, the court may consider the application, its supporting affidavit and attached exhibits.

Justice Kocuvie-Tay consequently deemed the application as moved, considered the materials filed and dismissed it.

However, the ruling did not set out the substantive reasons for rejecting the constitutional referral application. The judge stated that those reasons would be provided in the judgment she was about to deliver.